Chapter 3

Christenson is decidedly unimpressed by the outcome of Clinton's (1996) "technology in education" initiatives. He refers back to his Introduction, and points out (again) that "the billions that schools have spent on computers have had little effect on how teachers teach and students learn" (p. 72). ( So how do teachers teach and students learn...and why should computers make a difference in the basic paradigm of teaching and learning? )

Christensen returns to his motivation theme, suggesting that "building students' intrinsic motivtion through student-centered learning" should be a role assumed by "computers in schools." This builds on his earlier assertion that extrinsic motivation vanishes with affluence. In the face of little extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation is what will motivate students to learn. All of which brings us to the central question: "What is the purpose of using computers in school?"

If your subject is Architectural Drafting, then the answer probably goes something like: "To enable students to learn to use tools of industry-standard procedures for producing architectural drawings." If your subject is Statistical Analysis, you need computers and software to go beyond the simplest (and most useless) examples. If you are a geographer, then the fascination of GIS is a major lure. Are computers contributing to intrinsic or extrinsic motivation in these examples? ( What is the purpose of computers in your field of expertise? Could a professional survive in practice without using computers in the way your field uses them? is this extrinsic or intrinsic motivation? Does it matter? )

Christensen declares that the main reason for the unimpressive outcome of using computers in schools is attributable to the fact that schools have "crammed" computers into classrooms. This doesn't mean a lot of computers in a small space--as in the image I have added here.

"Cramming" is Christensen's term to describe what happens when an innovation is (mis)used to do an existing task, instead of the advent of the innovation spurring a re-thinking of the task. For example, writing of RCA, he comments that "their instinct was to utilize their existing business infrastructure and sell the disruptive products to their existing customers" (p. 79). The consequence of RCA's following its instinct was dire: "a few decades later, all the vacuum tube companies, including RCA, vaporized" (p. 80).

Starting on p. 74, Christensen declares (and then goes on to support) that "in every organization there are forces that shape and morph every new innovative proposal so that it fits the existing organization's own business model" (p. 74). This suggests that every innovation is initially used to do an existing job, or make something the way it was made before the innovation came along.

Starting the chainsaw

All of which reminds me of the story about the backwoods timber-cutter who bought "one of them new-fangled chainsaws" on one of his monthly visits to a wilderness outpost. He asked the salesman if he would be able to cut more timber with this thing than he could with his trusty axe and cross-cut saw. He was assured that if he wasn't totally pleased, he could return his purchase. The next month, he staggered into the wilderness outpost, threw the chain saw on the floor, and loudly declared that the *&%## thing was useless. The salesman apologized that it didn't work and asked if he could try it out to see what was wrong. "Of course," grunted the timber-cutter. The salesman primed the engine, pulled on the starting cord, and "gunned" the chain saw through a 20" diameter test log in no time. When he turned off the engine, the timber-cutter was standing in wide-eyed awe, whispering "what on earth was that 'broooomm' noise?"

Christensen suggests that by employing computers to "sustain and marginally improve the way they already teach" (p. 73), educators have effectively refrained from starting the chain saw. (How do you respond to this critique? )

Is it safe for children?

Christensen suggests that the appropriate niche for computers is "in places and for courses where there are no teachers to teach" (p. 73). ( How could this ensure that computers "will...disrupt the instructional job that teachers are doing" (p. 73)? )

Apple introduced the Apple IIe as a tool for children. I remember it well (though, sadly, I was not a child at the time). It was the first computer I used (mainly to run a wordprocessing program called "Zardax"--which was written by an acquaintance of mine). It truly was better than the alternative--which was no computer at all. (I couldn't afford to buy a DEC.) So, Apple did not try to "cram" the Apple IIe into the "sustaining innovation" back plane of the competition, where it was hopelessly underpowered and totally unusable. This leads to a...

KEY DECLARATION

"To succeed, disruptive technologies must be applied in applications where the alternative is nothing. Indeed, selecting these applications is far more important for the successful implementation of the technology than is the technology itself" (p. 74). ( Now, what applications could these be, given the curriculum and organizational structure of schools? )

The "Sustaining" of Every Innovation

Christensen makes a crucial point in illustrating that "companies shape every innovative idea to fit the interests of groups in the company that must support the proposal in order for it to receive funding" (p. 74-75). This way of working is entirely logical. Financial support is crucial because "innovative ideas never pop out of the innovators' heads as full-fledged business plans" (p. 75). They need to be refined, and, for this, they need to be "sold" to those who control the purse-strings. But....

Case Studies

Christensen gives three quite thought provoking examples of companies which failed to take advantage of innovations. These failures support the existence of conservative forces in organizations that tend to overpower innovations.

Nypro
The key point here is that the new, flexible Novoplast machine was not in the traditional "mold" (don't clap, just throw money) of Nypro's products, so it was rejected by all plants EXCEPT the two plants that could use it as sustaining technology. Low volume production was the antithesis of Nypro's then-current production values.

Merrill Lynch

(Reading this outside the revisionist perspective provided by the events of recent months is difficult.) The key point is that Merrill Lynch used the advent of on-line brokerage as sustaining technology which complemented their existing business. Charles Schwab implemented on-line brokerage as a disruptive technology and it replaced their existing business with a system that was vastly better (i.e. more profitable).

RCA
There are a number of key points in the discussion of RCA.

Established companies need to sell to their existing customers. A good example of this comes from the advertising world in which it is understood that car advertisements are aimed at those who already own that particular make of car. Car ads are designed to reinforce in the viewer's mind the wisdom of his/her decision to buy the car he/she presently owns. If a couple of viewers are impressed enough to change from a different make of car, that is a bonus. The prime targets of car ads are current owners.

Thus, when a disruptive technology comes along, established companies will do a poor job of selling the (by definition) poorer-performing disruptive product to their established customer base. The niche in which the poorer-performing disruptive product thrives is among those who have no alternative.

For example, when the transistor was invented, it could not compete with the vacuum tube in the applications in which the vacuum tube was already used. The transistor was an inferior product in the established applications, and established companies were not interested in it. However, the transistor made a hearing aid possible--an application for which the vacuum tube was entirely inferior (unless one wanted to carry around a very long extension cord).

Having established credibility in one market, the next application was in a little tinny radio--which was far inferior to the RCA table radio, except that it was portable. With the establishment of this "beachhead" application, the writing was on the wall for RCA.

What does all this have to do with education?

Educators have "crammed" computers into classrooms, using them in a very logical way "to supplement and reinforce the existing teaching model" (p. 82). ( How do you respond to this characterization? )

Consequently, and expectedly, computers, despite their enormous disruptive potential, have had little impact on teaching and learning. ( Is it possible that another explanation for the lack of impact of computers is that teaching and learning is not an appropriate niche for computers to occupy? )

"So how could schools implement computer-based learning in ways that transform teaching and learning" (p. 84)? Basically, by competing against nonconsumption, and transforming the classroom into a student-centric environment "where all students can learn in the ways their individual minds are wired to learn" (p. 86). ( Interesting use of the word "minds" here. What is the difference between "brain" and "mind?" )